Tag: arcCA 11.2

. . .and Counting

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Meetings are indispensable when you don’t want to do anything.”
— John Kenneth Galbraith

Number of new licenses issued in California
1989 – 1,339
2010 – 548
www.cab.ca.gov

Number of ARE divisions taken by California candidates
2009 – 11,262
2010 – 5,187
www.cab.ca.gov

Number of out-of-state architects receiving reciprocity in California
2003 – 224 (20 year high)
2010 – 77 (20 year low)
www.cab.ca.gov

Number of licensed architects in California
1995 – 20,367
2010 – 20,433
www.cab.ca.gov

Business structure of California architectural firms
3% Partnerships
6% Limited Liability Partnerships
15% Sole Proprietorships
38% C Corporations
38% S Corporations
www.managementdesign.com/survey.html

Construction types of jobs designed by California architectural firms

49% New Construction
33% Rehab / Renovation
6% New Interiors
6% Renovated Interiors
6% Other
www.managementdesign.com/survey.html

Client type for work done by California architectural firms
25% Private Individuals
21% Government
19% Institutional
14% Commercial
12% Developers
10% Other
www.managementdesign.com/survey.html

Project type of jobs designed by California architectural firms
20% Single Family Homes
17% Education
12% Office
10% Healthcare
6% Retail
6% Housing
5% Civic
4% Hospitality
4% Industrial
3% Master Planning
3% Recreation
3% Transportation
2% Mixed Use
2% Religious
www.managementdesign.com/survey.html

Average hourly billing rates used by California architectural firms
$200 Principal
160 Associate
150 Project Manager
135 Project Architect
130 Senior Designer
90 Junior Designer
www.managementdesign.com/survey.html

Architectural Record 2011 Good Design is Good Business Awards
Trumpf Campus, Stuttgart
Barkow Leibinger, Berlin
Mills College Gradate School of Business, Oakland
Bohlin Cywinski Jackson, San Francisco
The Power House Restoration/Renovation, St. Louis
Cannon Design, St Louis
Eileen Fisher, Inc., Corporate HQ: Irvington, NY
Earl Everett Ferguson Architect, Irvington, NY
Roca Gallery, Barcelona
Office of Architecture in Barcelona (OAB)
300 North LaSalle, Chicago
Pickard Chilton, New Haven, CT
Denver Art Museum Shop, Denver
Roth + Sheppard, Denver
The Ledge, Chicago
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, Chicago
Mercy Corps Headquarters, Portland, OR
THA Architecture, Portland, OR
archrecord.construction.com/news/2011/

Carpe per diem—seize the check.
— Robin Williams

 

Wind Power, Distributed

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Photographs courtesy of Tim Culvahouse, FAIA


I am fond of the corps de ballet of the Altamont Pass wind farm, one of three such grand arrays in the state—the other two are Tehachapi and San Gorgonio—row upon row of giant pinwheels, tracing the ridgelines and spinning in rhythmic counterpoint. Altamont was the first of the three and a pioneering endeavor in renewable energy production. It has its problems—of the three, it has proven the least kind to raptors, whose optical systems (I’m told) don’t process the rotation of the blades, seeing them instead as fixed disks, apparently ideal perches for surveying the landscape for prey. Slower turning turbines or turbines in other configurations will address that problem, as funds are available for replacement.

The big problem, though, is that Altamont is there, and I am here. Like the electricity generated at fossil fuel plants or nuclear plants or hydroelectric dams, the electricity from Altamont must be transmitted long distances to those of us who use it. And transmission involves loss. Transmission and centralized production are also big business, which tends to work against more local solutions.

Which is why I’m encouraged to see wind turbines cropping up singly and in pairs or threes in the Central Valley (those shown here are at a Safeway Distribution Center and Teichert Aggregates near Tracy). Less transmission loss + less dependence on large-scale (i.e., government subsidized) infrastructure should = something folks all along the political spectrum can get behind.

 

California Prefab: Current Market Report

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Silvercrest Homes


Since the financial crisis of 2008, the prefabricated building industry has undergone recession, forcing both well-established companies and venture-capitalist start-ups to reflect on their goals and respond in diverse ways, according to the differing situations of their assets and liabilities.

Historically, affordable manufactured homes have been produced through low cost materials and high volume production. The next generation of prefab companies is applying IT industry approaches to R&D, sustainability and improved quality. Lacking high volume production and still largely funded by venture capital, it remains to be seen which, if any, of the models will succeed.

Six students from the UC Berkeley graduate course entitled “Off-Site Fabrication,” taught by Professor Dana Buntrock, have examined this question. Based on original interviews with management and employees conducted during visits to fabrication plants and constructed projects, the following article is a brief synopsis of three case studies, providing a sample of the current prefabricated building industry in California: Silvercrest Homes, Zeta Communities, and Project FROG. For more on Project FROG, see the following article.

SILVERCREST
When Silvercrest Homes was founded in 1969, most other modular housing manufacturers led a dictatorial marketing campaign focused on high-volume production. Within a market dominated by standardization and uniformity, Silvercrest saw a business opportunity: customized homes to accommodate each market segment’s particular needs. According to Al Whitehouse, Silvercrest/Champion Homes General Manager, Silvercrest at its peak reached a target market ranging from families to the elderly and all homeowners in between.

Silvercrest Market Approach
During the market crisis, the costs of core commodity materials escalated. To survive in these conditions, Silvercrest fixed the budget they allocated to these variable costs and did not absorb the periodic price increases, which material cost erosion necessitated. Silvercrest had to consciously develop a home series that had a lower material content in one form or another and drop down from their original target. In addition, an uncontrollable retail marketing backlash has forced the company into an even tougher financial situation.

In the Silvercrest production process, the customers pull the system. The company only starts to build a house when there is a buyer, usually a developer. Since the market downturn, the company has closed 68% of its plants in 11 Western states, which has also impacted developers such as Sandalwood Estates, who relied on Silvercrest for decades, according to Sandalwood Estates Community Manager Kathy Fiebiger. Since the closure of the Silvercrest Woodland plant, the over four-fold increase in transportation costs is no longer economically viable for this developer.

The market for Silvercrest homes has also reversed. Originally, Silvercrest was the largest provider of modular homes for large private properties. Today, 70% are installed in mobile home parks, and only 30% are on private property.

As a result of all these factors, Silvercrest has been forced to deviate from its original market stronghold of higher quality and more expensive homes. They have developed a product series equivalent to those of their competitors and are selling these homes at even lower price points.

Currently, Silvercrest is also hoping to diversify its market by working on a variety of commercial projects, including offices, churches and synagogues, veterinary hospitals, and daycare centers.

Silvercrest Production
Six years ago, Silvercrest began implementing Lean Manufacturing methods in an effort to improve production efficiency for the future. According to Mike Hutchinson, Silvercrest/Champion Homes Quality Control Manager, they invested heavily in training all personnel and adopting policies of “continuous improvement” to change the company culture.

The new Lean production schedule depends on the plant’s activity, backlog size, and product order urgency. If enough orders are ready, a batch of ten houses is released to production.

Silvercrest has not yet realized the potential benefits of Lean management, but their creative approaches to optimize production efficiency and more collaborative relationships with their supply chain and customers will potentially be a tremendous advantage once the economy recovers. Silvercrest may be capable of offering better quality houses for a low target price.

ZETA
ZETA, an acronym for Zero Energy Technology and Architecture, is a venture capital start-up founded in 2007. Their target market is high production, sustainable, and net-zero energy modular building solutions for mass-market adoption in the United States.

ZETA Co-Founder Shilpa Sankaran notes that, observing the collapse of popular “prefab” companies, it became apparent that a business model focused only on single-family homes was not scalable. After their first successful project in Oakland, California, in order to increase production capacity, they leased a 91,000 square foot production plant in Sacramento.

ZETA Market Approach

ZETA’s target markets are not only multi-family and single-family housing, but institutional and educational facilities as well. This scope requires them to be flexible in both their business plan and production system, according to Sankaran. They have adapted their original business plan to include not only design and production, but also funding sources, planning, zoning, code compliance, and state approvals, in order to facilitate developers throughout the process in adapting to prefabricated systems.

This concept of flexibility raises the issue of standardization vs. customization. Ideally, the product should include as few customizations as possible. The reality, as ZETA General Manager Kara Tarango notes, is different: “You don’t dictate what you are going to build, the market dictates. The only thing you can dictate is how your product will adapt to the market.”

ZETA Production
ZETA originally tried to incorporate IT industry production systems into the modular building industry. However, a modular building company might produce 10 products a day with 10,000 parts, while a computer plant produces up to 10,000 products a day with 10 parts. These fundamental differences resulted in numerous production challenges during the design and construction of their first project. In response, they incorporated traditional factory building expertise and leased a high production capacity modular building production plant.

The new plant consists of a low-tech automated tiger saw, along with insulation, polyurethane glue, and paint spray stations. The rest of the production assembly line utilizes standard construction equipment optimized for labor efficiency. Their designs and materials are high quality, sustainable, and energy efficient. All buildings are “Net-Zero Ready,” allowing customers to add renewable energy to achieve net-zero energy.

Unfortunately, since the production plant was leased, ZETA has not yet utilized their full production capacity; only five buildings have been produced. Due to the fact that ZETA is addressing the residential, commercial and institutional markets, they may have a market advantage over the other companies. Given their flexibility in market approach coupled with a very high production capacity, they are well positioned to be successful.

Project FROG: “Better, greener, faster, cheaper”

Project FROG is a venture-backed San Francisco-based firm specializing in high performance, prefabricated classrooms. Run by business professionals and designers, this company differentiates itself from other modular building companies in its approach and structure, as well as its intended market. From the start, explains Evan Nakamura, Senior Director of Product Development, Project FROG avoided the capital-intensive investment of their own production facilities, opting instead to closely partner with fabricators to develop and produce the building components. The company focuses on developing turnkey buildings with a systematized, pre-engineered kit of parts to achieve efficiency with flexibility.

Project FROG Market Approach
Originally, Project FROG saw its business opportunity in the increasing demand for fast, flexible, and affordable portable classrooms, which until 1998 were required to comprise 30% of the classrooms in California schools, according to the California Portable Classrooms Study (http://www.arb.ca.gov/research/apr/past/00-317_v3.pdf ). FROG classrooms present a healthy alternative for existing portables, but since “FROGs” are prefabricated but not “relocatable,” they have had to follow the same lengthy funding process as permanent classrooms.

Project FROG Production: the Kit of Parts
Project FROG is based on the concept of product development, similar to Apple or Boeing, which through design iterations creates a highly systematized kit of parts, produced by a network of fabricators. One of FROG’s novelties is its implementation of energy and cost modeling to achieve climatic adaptation and precision fabrication through the combination of interchangeable components. The key challenge here is to find the optimal point between manufacturing efficiency and the customization demanded by clients. The kit of parts, which specifies very precise connections and tolerances, requires a carefully managed network of suppliers and transportation schedules. Because of decentralized production, all components are first assembled on the building site, requiring additional costly labor if unforeseen issues arise.

The company has invested significant venture capital in order to explore and implement the customization necessitated by climatic response, clients’ needs, and technological systems. With costs similar to those of traditional buildings, speed and technology seem to be FROG’s primary assets. Selling greenness and technology while keeping prices low remains a tough challenge, especially in this economic downturn.

Conclusion

Since 2008, all three companies have had to reorient their market approach to incorporate greater market diversity and production flexibility. Furthermore, all three are struggling to find the balance between customization and high volume production in order to survive.

While the older establishment has focused on achieving economies of scale more efficiently through the implementation of lean strategies, newer companies anticipate that innovative production tools and IT, as well as higher levels of customization and quality, are key to the future of manufactured architecture.

Another key distinguishing factor is the scope of the companies’ networks in their target market territory. Silvercrest has only limited tools in place for a new market, but can depend on its reputable roots. On the other hand, the start-ups face a more tenuous future; Zeta is having trouble launching, while FROG seems to be only slightly more successful, with lower capital demand and a more template-based approach. Despite their strong sources of capital and firm expectations that architecture needs manufactured production, will they gain enough leverage to become a viable and sustainable business?

This is a challenging time for the construction industry as a whole, and, in spite of its promise, the off-site fabrication community is not immune to this drastic economic downturn. However, California, more than most states, has long been a leader in off-site fabrication practices. Japan, our seismic sister across the ocean, has demonstrated the value of rapid and large-scale production plants as we were completing this article. Several hundred extremely small housing units were in construction within a week of the March 11th earthquake and tsunami. Will our industry be ready when it’s our turn?

Editor’s note: As of press time, GE has led a $22 million investment round in Project FROG and begun construction of one of its prefabricated environmentally sustainable buildings at GE’s Learning Center in Ossining, NY.

 

Architect as Developer: The San Diego Story

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The Q - Jonathan Segal Architect - Photograph courtesy of Jeff Durken

arcCA asked three architect-developers in San Diego, where the species seems to flourish, to tell us about their motivations and experiences. Here, Lloyd Russell and Jonathan Segal join in a dialogue; Ted Smith’s narrative follows.

What prompted you to undertake your first development project?

Lloyd Russell: There was no work happening at the time, so we used to joke that the only way to get hired was to hire ourselves. At a time when architects are getting marginalized in the building industry, it is empowering to be in the middle of things bringing a project to realization. And, if you do it well, you get to own it. It’s also putting your money where your mouth is. Architects promote the profession with the argument that we add value. Well, why not realize that value?

Jonathan Segal: I never wanted to have a client after working at two firms and seeing the lack of respect the clients give to the architects and the compromises they were forced to make. Just as significant was the pittance they were paid in comparison to the contractor.


Did you have training or experience that specifically prepared you to do development?
LR: I used to believe what my teachers at San Luis Obispo were telling me, namely that architecture would save the world. Problem was, I had to drive thru LA to get to school from San Diego, and I could not rationalize what I was seeing from the freeway through that paradigm. So I got interested not just in how buildings were built but why. And who made those decisions.

JS: I’m Jewish. But all architects have the tools required to do development.


arcCA 11.2, AIACC, arcCA Journal












Centre Street Lofts, Lloyd Russell Architect
Photo by Harrison Photographic
arcCA 11.2, AIACC, arcCA Journal
    Richman/Poorman
    Smith & Others

Are you also the general contractor for your projects?

LR: Owner-builder, technically.

JS: Not in the beginning, but after building a few projects and seeing the generals take no responsibility for the work I paid them to do, I finally woke up and vowed never to hire another contractor again. They add no value and only subtract from the process, and now we always build our own work and have never looked back.


Did you have training or experience that prepared you to act as G.C.?

LR: I worked construction trades through school and after graduation without telling anyone I was a graduate. I got an earful on what contractors think about architects.

JS: Yes: the same experience that all architects have. Contractors don’t have any better skills than we do, and they have zero passion in our process. Passion is at the heart of every project.


What is your approach to risk management?

LR:
I prefer to develop multifamily for rent instead of for sale. Ironically, when you take on all the responsibilities/liabilities of multiple roles, you get to a tipping point where the risk becomes less, because you won’t sue yourself.

JS: Build your own stuff; get the subcontractors to indemnify you, not the other way around; build apartments, never condos.


What do you most enjoy about your mode of practice?

LR: It’s more a lifestyle than a practice. You make different decisions on when, where, and why to take on a project when you have a stable
cash flow from prior projects.

JS: Multi-tasking and seeing our sculptures take shape. Most importantly, we have a sustainable practice that has rental income and creates long term balance sheet growth. It’s time to help all other architects do what we do.

Ted Smith: I first developed a house for my family. I’m not sure you call that development, but I guess it is. That was in 1975. Five years later, the economy was crashing, no one was hiring architects, and I couldn’t make my mortgage payment, so I borrowed one last $20,000 from a hard money lender and builtmy first real development, where I was counting on renting space to pay the bills. That was the first of a series of shared houses with six suites in each, with private exterior entrances, that I called GoHomes. These turned out to be popular, and I built five such houses over as many years, each with six to eight suites, providing very affordable ownership in pricy Del Mar Terrace.

Over this same period, the demographic of the neighborhood changed from surfers and academics at UCSD to yuppies, with property values as their main interest. The new people didn’t like affordable housing, so I left the Terrace and joined my good friend Rob Quigley downtown, where he and Kathleen Hallahan had built their new home and office in Little Italy. Kathy McCormick, my collaborator and by the way girlfriend, was looking at the Sunday paper, and she saw a lot that cost about the same as the lots in Del Mar Terrace, but you could build a big building there, and there were no Nimbys. So we moved our practice downtown and built San Diego’s first (as far as we knew) townhouses, something Kathy was championing, along with a bunch of GoHomes. We called the building the Richman/Poorman building, since it combined high-end row houses with tiny apartments in one building.

We found these experiences extremely rewarding, being able to invent the building type, which seemed much more substantial than decorating some developer’s bad idea. We could serve a population that we understood and direct the development to places that were more friendly to the environment than, say, the big custom homes we had been designing in Fairbanks Ranch. This ability to control the project remains the overriding motivation behind deciding to be an architect/developer. Of course, we also had learned that it was easier to borrow money from banks than to collect it from clients, and the income from apartments was recession proof, freeing up the anxiety that comes with the cyclical traditional practice of architecture.

I was untrained when I began, and that naiveté is probably the only reason I would have tried development. Certainly, a project like the GoHomes would not have come from someone with wisdom. If I had understood the complexities, I probably would have shied away.

I’ve always built the projects I have developed. I had built my first house, and I always understood that the construction is where the money is. I also learned that it was less trouble to be the contractor than argue with one. I learned to build on the job, and any mistakes I made were well worth the substantial savings.

My staff has always been young architects, whom I would partner with to accomplish the projects. This is expensive, because you end up giving away a lot more than you might if you had the money to hire, but a group is more powerful than an individual, and I have always been a bit of a socialist when it comes to being fair and providing opportunities. When one develops, profits are way down the road, so it is good to have all the staff on board, agreeing to show up and work for some common goal way off in the future, and a group helps establish a discipline that working alone does not. Everyone agrees to show up first thing in the morning and work until dark. Also, many jobs just require a number of people to accomplish, like framing or building a foundation or placing the windows. We always do about half the subcontracts, as well as act as the GC. I have had many young, talented architects help make the projects, and they have nearly all been partners. Only on very large projects have they been joined by paid staff.

As soon as projects become larger than, say, four units, a rich man is required to cosign the loans. So these projects are not for beginners without wealth. Small projects are also the projects that need to get built, infill. Normal developers don’t want to build small, because the effort is the same no matter the scale. I prefer a street of individual ownerships, an expression of community, over a full-block building that seems more to express a developer’s big money dreams. The big (and mostly bad) projects get built anyway. It’s the fine-grained projects that require a very large amount of work for their size. The purpose of the Master in Real Estate Development program at Woodbury University is to teach these skills to young architects, who are the ones schooled enough in what is good urbanism to take these infill projects on. The big guys can go ahead building the full blocks, tracts, and industrial parks.

I manage my risks by doing as much as I can by myself and by careful choice of partners. That way, when something goes wrong, it is our fault. I can get a screwdriver and fix it, rather than hire a lawyer. I also build for a market of young, artistic people, the kind who see the world in a good way. I am less comfortable building for people with money. If they have money, they are probably not my market; and, besides, they are probably the kind of people who will sue me, rather than be reasonable. This has worked well for me. I haven’t been sued as a developer, except once almost by a disgruntled partner. I figured out how to buy the unhappy partner out, and it all was OK. That is one instance in what has been thirty years of development at this point. So, risk management has more to do with picking partners than buying insurance.

I enjoy development, because it builds wealth, and it builds those projects that would not be built by the normal industry. I love being in control, and I am always advising young architects to stop traditional practice as soon as possible. It seems to me that the normal practice of architecture is a foolish endeavor, where wonder is promised in school only to run up against the sad reality that is normal practice or services for hire. Traditional practitioners, except in extremely rare cases, make way less money and have way less control, so the architecture is worse and the income intermittent. Of course, there are exceptions to anything one says. Certainly there are many good architects, who, with savvy political skills, navigate the treachery of traditional practice and even make great buildings, but I’ve never been too good at trying to sell an idea; I’d rather just decide to do it. It’s enough trouble just to sell an idea to myself.